In Defense of the Harmless Error Rule’s Clear and Convincing Evidence Standard: A Response to Professor Baron by Glover, Mark
Washington and Lee Law Review Online 
Volume 73 Issue 1 Article 9 
7-25-2016 
In Defense of the Harmless Error Rule’s Clear and Convincing 
Evidence Standard: A Response to Professor Baron 
Mark Glover 
University of Wyoming College of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr-online 
 Part of the Estates and Trusts Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Mark Glover, In Defense of the Harmless Error Rule’s Clear and Convincing Evidence Standard: A 
Response to Professor Baron, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 289 (2016), 
https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr-online/vol73/iss1/9 
This Response is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at Washington & Lee 
University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law 
Review Online by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more 
information, please contact christensena@wlu.edu. 
 
289 
In Defense of the Harmless Error Rule’s 
Clear and Convincing Evidence 
Standard: 
A Response to Professor Baron 
Mark Glover* 
Abstract 
In Irresolute Testators, Clear and Convincing Wills Law, 
Professor Jane Baron draws attention to a conflict between the 
mechanics of the law of wills and the realities of testation. Baron 
observes that the law of wills is designed to be used as a tool by 
resolute and rationale testators to communicate their intent 
regarding the distribution of property upon death. However, the 
law’s archetypical testator does not represent the many real 
testators who are irresolute and irrational, those possessing 
incoherent and only partially formed thoughts regarding the 
disposition of their estates. 
Based upon the disconnect between the law’s paradigm of 
resolute will-making and the irresoluteness of testation in the real 
world, Baron argues that reforms that have given probate courts 
discretion to correct mistakes in testation do not function 
appropriately. For instance, Baron argues that the harmless error 
rule, which allows courts to excuse defects in a testator’s 
compliance with will-execution formalities when the testator’s 
intent is established by clear and convincing evidence, does not 
meaningfully limit probate courts’ discretion to correct mistakes. 
Specifically, she argues that many courts are concerned with not 
only the technical mistakes of resolute testators but also the more 
troubling mistakes of irresolute testators, and consequently, these 
courts overreach the boundaries of the harmless error rule. 
                                                                                                     
 * Associate Professor of Law, University of Wyoming College of Law; 
LL.M., Harvard Law School, 2011; J.D., magna cum laude, Boston University 
School of Law, 2008. 
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This essay acknowledges Baron’s insight regarding the 
tension between the law and reality but questions whether this 
tension renders the harmless error rule and its clear and 
convincing evidence standard ineffective. More particularly, this 
essay argues that, despite potential overreaching by some courts, 
the clear and convincing evidence standard likely operates in the 
way that reformers intended and that the harmless error rule 
represents an improvement upon the conventional law of will-
execution. 
 
In her insightful new article, Irresolute Testators, Clear 
and Convincing Wills Law,1 Professor Jane Baron sheds 
light on an often overlooked tension between the law of wills 
and the realities of testation. She suggests that the law 
“contemplates a coldly rational, choosing testamentary self 
for whom wills rules are a means for furthering self-
determined ends.”2 However, she observes that 
“many . . . testators . . . do not seem to correspond to th[is] 
model.”3 “These testators,” Baron explains, “cannot bring 
themselves to make final decisions about their property”;4 
instead, they “have ambiguous, fluid intentions.”5 The law’s 
paradigmatic testator, who is unerring, rational, and 
resolute, therefore stands in stark contrast to the many real 
testators, who are erring, irrational, and irresolute. 
To illustrate the law’s model testator, Baron focuses on 
the issue of will-authentication.6 Under the conventional 
                                                                                                     
 1.  Jane B. Baron, Irresolute Testators, Clear and Convincing Wills Law, 
73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3 (2016). 
 2.  Id. at 8. 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  Id. For a discussion of why recognition of one’s mortality might make it 
difficult for the testator to make estate planning decisions, see Mark Glover, A 
Therapeutic Jurisprudential Framework of Estate Planning, 35 SEATTLE U. L. 
REV. 427, 434–38 (2012). For a discussion of how will-execution formalities 
might alleviate the emotional toll of death anxiety, see generally Mark Glover, 
The Therapeutic Function of Testamentary Formality, 61 U. KAN. L. REV. 139 
(2012). 
 5.  Baron, supra note 1, at 29. 
 6.  Baron also devotes attention to the issue of correction of mistaken 
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law’s rule of strict compliance, probate courts distinguish 
authentic wills from inauthentic wills by relying solely upon 
a set of prescribed formalities.7 If a will is written, signed by 
the testator, and attested by two witnesses, the court 
determines that the testator intended the will to be legally 
effective.8 Conversely, if a purported will does not comply 
with these formalities, the court determines that the 
testator did not intend the will to be legally effective.9 Thus, 
the conventional law envisions a decisive testator who 
carefully and deliberately uses the formalities of will-
execution to communicate her fully formed intent to the 
probate court. 
The law has retained its assumption of resoluteness in 
reforms to the way it authenticates wills. Whereas under 
conventional law, probate courts conclusively presume that 
the testator did not intend a noncompliant will to be legally 
effective, the Uniform Probate Code (UPC) recognizes the 
harmless error rule, which grants courts discretion to 
overlook will-execution errors.10 In the small minority of 
                                                                                                     
terms in wills. See id. at 14–15 (discussing one argument that “the law should 
be prepared to correct the error if the error is proved to a high degree of 
certainty”). 
 7.  See JESSE DUKEMINIER & ROBERT H. SITKOFF, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND 
ESTATES 153 (9th ed. 2013) (discussing wills formalities). 
 8.  See Mark Glover, Minimizing Probate-Error Risk, 49 U. MICH. J. L. 
REFORM 335, 363–66 (2016) (explaining that under conventional law, compliance 
with the prescribed formalities is not conclusive evidence of a will’s 
authenticity). 
 9.  See id. at 343 (“When the court applies the rule of strict compliance, it 
invalidates a will if the testator failed to comply with any of the prescribed 
formalities.”). 
 10.  See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503 (2010) 
Although a document or writing added upon a document was not 
executed in compliance with [the prescribed formalities], the 
document is treated as if it had been executed in compliance . . . if the 
proponent of the document or writing establishes by clear and 
convincing evidence that the decedent intended the document or 
writing to constitute . . . the decedent’s will . . . .  
The precursor to the UPC’s harmless error rule was Professor John Langbein’s 
substantial compliance doctrine. See generally John H. Langbein, Substantial 
Compliance with the Wills Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1975) (discussing the 
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jurisdictions that has adopted the UPC’s reform,11 when the 
testator leaves behind a will that does not comply with the 
prescribed formalities, the court can consider extrinsic 
evidence that suggests the testator’s noncompliance was the 
product of mistake and that she truly intended the will to be 
legally effective.12 Simply put, the harmless error rule 
transforms the conventional law’s conclusive presumption 
into a rebuttable one.13 
The harmless error rule maintains the law’s paradigm 
of resoluteness, as it assumes that the testator had a fixed, 
fully formed intent but simply failed to communicate that 
intent in the way the law dictates. Although the reform 
acknowledges that a testator might err in the way she 
communicates her intent, it does not contemplate a testator 
whose intent was amorphous or uncertain. As Baron 
summarizes, the harmless error rule is designed to correct 
only the “technical, innocuous errors” that the law’s model 
testator makes;14 it “do[es] not address or remedy [the] 
irresolution” of actual testators who do not conform to the 
law’s archetype.15 
Drawing upon this tension between the law’s resolute 
testator and reality’s irresolute testator, Baron critiques the 
harmless error rule and probate courts’ application of it. 
                                                                                                     
doctrine). 
 11.  See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 7, at 184 (listing California, 
Colorado, Hawaii, Michigan, Montana, New Jersey, Ohio, South Dakota, Utah, 
and Virginia as adoptees). 
 12.  See Glover, supra note 8, at 383–84 (“[T]he UPC allows the court to 
excuse harmless formal defects when evidence suggests that a decedent 
intended a noncompliant document to constitute a legally effective will.”); see 
generally John H. Langbein, Excusing Harmless Errors in the Execution of Wills: 
A Report on Australia’s Tranquil Revolution in Probate Law, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 
1 (1987) (discussing the harmless error rule as developed in Australian courts). 
 13.  See Mark Glover, Rethinking the Testamentary Capacity of Minors, 79 
MO. L. REV. 69, 100–01 (2014) (suggesting that a “law reform movement” is 
underway that would allow probate courts to take independent evidence of 
testamentary intent into account). 
 14.  Baron, supra note 1, at 7. 
 15.  Id. at 26. 
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Specifically, she takes aim at the clear and convincing 
evidence standard that is embedded within the rule. Under 
the rule, the court’s discretion to correct will-execution 
errors is limited to situations in which the testator’s intent 
is established by clear and convincing evidence.16 Although 
this evidentiary standard is not clearly defined, it requires 
greater certainty than the fifty-one percent that is required 
under the preponderance of the evidence standard, which is 
typically used in civil litigation, but less than the near one-
hundred percent certainty that is required under the 
criminal law’s reasonable doubt standard.17 When applied 
in the context of the harmless error rule, the clear and 
convincing evidence standard directs the probate court to 
overlook a will-execution error only when it is fairly certain 
that the testator intended a noncompliant will to be legally 
effective. 
The clear and convincing evidence standard is meant to 
serve as a limit on the court’s discretion to excuse will-
execution defects. The official comments to the UPC’s 
harmless error rule explain: “By placing the burden of proof 
upon the proponent of a defective instrument, and by 
requiring the proponent to discharge that burden by clear 
and convincing evidence . . . , [the harmless error rule] 
imposes procedural standards appropriate to the 
seriousness of the issue.”18 In essence, the procedural 
safeguard of the clear and convincing evidence standard 
restricts the cases to which the court’s discretion applies to 
only those in which the testator’s mistake is clear. Under 
conventional law, the probate court had no discretion to 
excuse will-execution defects, and therefore no limitation 
was needed. Once the law grants courts discretion, however, 
policymakers must decide how great that discretion should 
                                                                                                     
 16.  UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503 (2010). 
 17.  Glover, supra note 8, at 399–400. 
 18.  UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503 cmt. 
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be. In this regard, the proponents of reform believed that 
limiting the court’s discretion through the clear and 
convincing evidence standard would serve two important 
functions: (1) it would appropriately allocate the risk of 
incorrect determinations of a will’s authenticity; and (2) it 
would minimize litigation regarding the authentication of 
wills. Baron doubts whether the clear and convincing 
evidence standard meaningfully serves either of these 
functions. 
The first important function that reformers intended 
the clear and convincing evidence standard to serve is the 
allocation of risk between an erroneous finding of 
authenticity and an erroneous finding of inauthenticity. The 
harmless error rule’s primary goal is to prevent the 
invalidity of clearly authentic wills due to technical formal 
defects.19 The idea is that courts can judge the authenticity 
of wills based upon extrinsic evidence and can thereby avoid 
incorrect determinations of inauthenticity. However, once 
courts are granted the discretion to evaluate the 
authenticity of wills, the possibility arises that they will 
exercise that discretion incorrectly.20 In particular, the 
harmless error rule presents the risk of two types of error.  
First, a false-negative outcome is produced when the court 
fails to exercise its discretion to excuse a formal defect 
when, in fact, the will is authentic. Second, a false-positive 
outcome is produced when the court exercises its discretion 
to overlook a formal defect when, in fact, the will is 
inauthentic.21 Recognizing the possibility of both types of 
error, proponents of reform anticipated that the clear and 
convincing evidence standard would guide courts to excuse 
                                                                                                     
 19.  See Glover, supra note 8, at 388 (“[The harmless error rule] grants 
probate courts the discretion to excuse will-execution errors related to the 
attestation requirement.”). 
 20.  See id. at 384 (“[P]robate courts will not always correctly judge the 
authenticity of a noncompliant will.”). 
 21.  See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 7, at 153 (describing false-
negatives); Glover, supra note 8, at 338 (defining false-positives). 
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will-execution errors in the most obvious cases of mistake 
and to avoid exercising their discretion in more difficult 
cases.22 In this way, the clear and convincing evidence 
standard allocates risk of error between false-positive 
outcomes and false-negative outcomes. 
Although Baron acknowledges that the clear and 
convincing evidence standard might play a role in sorting 
harmless errors from more problematic errors,23 she 
questions whether considerations other than clear and 
convincing evidence are driving the decisions in some cases. 
Specifically, Baron suggests that “[i]t seems possible that 
the testators’ conformity to the will-making paradigm is 
more important . . . than the evidentiary standard.”24 She 
notes that the cases in which courts seem most willing to 
excuse will-execution defects involve testators who had a 
clearly formed intent regarding the disposition of property 
after death and who largely complied with the formalities of 
will-execution.25 Thus, the more similar a testator is to the 
law’s unerring, rational, and resolute archetype, the more 
likely the court is to excuse a will-execution defect.26 Based 
upon this correlation, Baron observes, “[I]f these facts are 
determinative, it’s hard to see what work the clear and 
convincing standard is doing.”27 
Baron correctly perceives the connection between the 
                                                                                                     
 22.  See Glover, supra note 8, at 400 (“[T]he higher standards of proof could 
encourage courts to use their best efforts to correctly decide the issue of a will’s 
authenticity . . . .”). 
 23.  See Baron, supra note 1, at 33 (contrasting two cases and suggesting 
that “the clear and convincing evidence standard does seem to be doing some 
important work in both cases”). 
 24.  Id. at 55. 
 25.  See id. at 54–55 (stating that many cases “ultimately turn on whether 
the evidence of the decedent’s intent with respect to the document in question is 
clear and convincing”). 
 26.  See id. at 55 (“Paradoxically, the closer the testator conforms to the 
paradigm, the less careful the courts seem to be about openly confronting 
evidentiary weaknesses.”). 
 27.  Id. 
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law’s paradigmatic testator and the harmless error rule, but 
she incorrectly concludes that conformity to the paradigm is 
altogether unrelated to the harmless error calculus and the 
clear and convincing evidence standard. In particular, the 
level of formality that the testator’s defective will displays is 
integral to the operation of the harmless error rule. Instead 
of courts wholly ignoring the testator’s attempted will-
execution when applying the harmless error rule, reformers 
anticipated that the degree to which the testator complied 
with the prescribed formalities would itself serve as 
evidence of the testator’s intent.28 Therefore, the level of 
formality of the testator’s attempted will-execution is 
inversely related to the amount of extrinsic evidence that 
probate courts need to excuse a will-execution defect. More 
drastic deviations from the prescribed will-execution process 
necessitate greater extrinsic evidence of intent, and lesser 
deviations require less extrinsic evidence. The UPC 
expressly acknowledges this connection, when it suggests 
that “[t]he larger the departure from [the prescribed] 
formality, the harder it will be to satisfy the Court that the 
instrument reflects the testator’s intent.”29 Thus, the 
correlation between a testator’s conformance with the law’s 
will-execution paradigm and a probate court’s willingness to 
excuse a will-execution defect is entirely consistent with 
how reformers envisioned the harmless error rule and its 
clear and convincing evidence standard would operate. 
The second important function that reformers intended 
the clear and convincing evidence standard to serve is the 
suppression of litigation. Once probate courts are granted 
discretion to overlook formal defects, the concern arises that 
proponents of noncompliant wills will flood the courts with 
                                                                                                     
 28.  See Langbein, supra note 12, at 52 (“The larger the departure from the 
purposes of Wills Act formality, the harder it is to excuse a defective 
instrument.”). 
 29.  UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503 cmt. (2010). 
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harmless error litigation.30 In turn, the cost of 
overburdening the probate system could outweigh whatever 
benefits the harmless error rule might produce. The 
proponents of reform envisioned that the clear and 
convincing evidence standard would limit the court’s 
discretion to such an extent that litigation rates would 
remain low. In particular, by placing a relatively high 
burden on the proponent of a defective will, reformers 
intended the clear and convincing evidence standard to 
weed out frivolous litigation involving little chance of 
success.31 
Like her critique of the allocation of risk function, 
Baron’s take on the clear and convincing evidence 
standard’s role in suppressing litigation is more skeptical 
than critical. Baron points out: “There is no way to ascertain 
whether the [reported] cases are typical of disputes arising 
around wills generally or mistaken wills particularly. It is 
possible that the reforms are working as their proponents 
expected, deterring litigation in all but the most contested 
cases.”32 Implicit in this statement is that it is also possible 
that the clear and convincing evidence standard is not 
deterring litigation. Baron’s point is that whatever the 
reported cases suggest about the rates of harmless error 
litigation, we do not know what impact the harmless error 
rule has had on the probate system in general. 
Baron is right to point out that the reported cases do 
not give us a clear picture of the numerous unreported cases 
that flow through the probate system each year. 
                                                                                                     
 30.  See Mark Glover, Decoupling the Law of Will-Execution, 88 ST. JOHN’S 
L. REV. 597, 631 (2014) (“[B]y channeling all valid wills into substantially the 
same form, the strict compliance requirement minimizes the court’s discretion 
in evaluating the genuineness of wills and consequently increases certainty 
regarding which wills are valid and which are not. The increased certainty 
suppresses litigation involving formal wills . . . .”). 
 31.  See Baron, supra note 1, at 22–23 (noting that a higher standard of 
proof deters potential plaintiffs from bringing suits based on insufficient 
evidence). 
 32.  Id. at 28. 
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Nonetheless, it is possible to dive into unreported records 
that are located in probate courts across the country. And 
although there is certainly more empirical probate research 
to be done,33 the initial results are promising for harmless 
error advocates. For instance, in a recent empirical study of 
probate records from Alameda County, California, Professor 
David Horton examined 571 cases of decedents who died in 
2007.34 California enacted its harmless error rule during the 
time period covered by Horton’s research, and consequently, 
harmless error litigation rates could not be measured using 
the entirety of Horton’s sample.35 The portion of the 
sampled cases that overlapped the enactment of the 
harmless error rule, however, produced no instances of 
harmless error litigation. Horton explains, “I did not 
uncover a single litigant who attempted to invoke the rule—
a finding that might belie doomsday claims about harmless 
error overburdening courts.”36 As Baron correctly points out, 
even if the rates of harmless error litigation are low, we do 
not know for certain that the clear and convincing evidence 
standard is the mechanism that is deterring litigation.37 
                                                                                                     
 33.  See generally Thomas E. Simmons, Wills Above Ground, 23 ELDER L.J. 
343 (2016). 
 34.  See David Horton, Wills Law on the Ground, 62 UCLA L. REV. 1094, 
1120–22 (2015) (finding that low harmless error litigation rates comports with 
the experience of other jurisdictions); UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503 (2010) cmt. 
(“Experience in Israel and South Australia strongly supports the view that a 
dispensing power like [the harmless error rule] will not breed litigation.”). 
 35.  See Horton, supra note 34, at 1139 
California lawmakers approved the bill that authorized harmless 
error on July 1, 2008. At that time, 138 (24 percent) of the estate in 
my spreadsheet had closed. By January 1, 2009, when the statute 
became effective, that number had grown to 293 (51 percent). Thus, 
my date provide a partial glimpse of the relevant period. 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  See Baron, supra note 1, at 28–29 n.115 
The reformer claim that the clear and convincing evidence standard 
would deter trivial litigation assumes that potential contestants, 
familiar with the newly-reformed law, will decide whether or not to 
litigate based on a rational assessment of their chances of prevailing. 
[However,] [t]here is little empirical evidence to support the claim 
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Nevertheless, it is also true that we do not know that the 
clear and convincing evidence standard is not the driving 
force behind low litigation rates. Thus, at the very least, 
Horton’s research suggests that it is possible that the clear 
and convincing evidence standard is serving its intended 
purpose.38 
Whatever skepticism Baron might have regarding the 
effectiveness of the clear and convincing evidence standard 
in limiting the exercise of discretion by courts that are 
committed to applying the harmless error rule as reformers 
intended, her primary criticism of the standard involves the 
application of the rule by courts that are concerned about 
both technical will-execution errors and non-technical 
mistakes. In particular, Baron argues that the clear and 
convincing evidence standard does not serve its restrictive 
purpose because the harmless error rule does not account 
for the irresoluteness of everyday testators. She observes 
that, “[t]he clear and convincing evidence standard 
addresses only the technical errors of the self-reliant 
choosing testamentary self. But at least some courts care 
also about the more complicated errors of the vulnerable, 
irresolute testamentary self. These courts push against the 
reforms’ boundaries.”39 Put differently, Baron argues that 
probate courts sometimes exercise discretion that falls 
outside the bounds of the harmless error rule because they 
want to correct the inattentiveness and indecisiveness of 
irresolute testators in addition to the technical errors of the 
resolute. Based upon this overreaching, Baron concludes 
that “the clear and convincing evidence standard has not, 
                                                                                                     
that decisions of prevailing at trial, as opposed to intensity of feelings 
based on family circumstances. 
 38.  See Simmons, supra note 33, at 362 (“Functionalists predicted that 
allowing imperfectly executed wills when a heightened burden of proof was met 
would result in a flood of litigation. Professor Horton’s sampling overlaps 
California’s adoption of the harmless error rule, but he found no contests 
involving the harmless error rule. So much for . . . a flood.”). 
 39.  Baron, supra note 1, at 8. 
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and will not, function as a serious limit on mistake 
correction.”40   
Baron’s point is well taken. It is true that courts have 
not applied the harmless error rule consistently and within 
the bounds that reformers intended.41 But what is not as 
clear is how problematic this inconsistency and 
overreaching is. First, Baron acknowledges that the corpus 
of harmless error case law is limited due to the rule’s 
infancy.42 Therefore, it is entirely possible that, as courts 
gain greater familiarity with the harmless error rule and 
experience with its application, judicial restraint and 
decisional consistency will develop. Even if it continues, 
however, the overreaching about which Baron is concerned 
does not necessarily indicate that the harmless error rule’s 
clear and convincing evidence standard is failing to 
constrain courts in the exercise of discretion. Indeed, 
without the clear and convincing evidence standard, probate 
courts might step outside the bounds of the harmless error 
rule even farther than they do now. 
But regardless of whether the clear and convincing 
evidence standard is in some way serving its restrictive 
purpose, the most important question is whether the 
overreaching that is occurring is tolerable. More 
particularly, the issue is whether a harmless error rule with 
nebulous bounds is preferable to the conventional law’s rule 
of strict compliance. Because the overarching goal of the law 
in this area is to fulfill the testator’s intent,43 this question 
                                                                                                     
 40.  Id. 
 41.  See Mark Glover, A Taxonomy of Testamentary Intent, 23 GEO. MASON 
L. REV. 569, 603–11 (2016) (providing examples of the inconsistent application of 
the harmless error rule). 
 42.  See Baron, supra note 1, at 28 (“The universe of case law is not 
particularly large.”). 
 43.  See Robert H. Sitkoff, Trusts and Estates: Implementing Freedom of 
Disposition, 58 ST. LOUIS L.J. 643, 644 (2014) (“[T]he American law of succession 
facilitates, rather than regulates, the carrying out of the decedent’s intent. Most 
of the law of succession is concerned with enabling posthumous enforcement of 
the actual intent of the decedent or, failing this, giving effect to the decedent’s 
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should be answered by evaluating which method of will-
authentication fulfills the intent of testators to the greatest 
extent at an acceptable rate of litigation. In this regard, 
proponents of reform have persuasively argued that the 
harmless error rule is better than the rule of strict 
compliance in fulfilling the testator’s intent,44 and, as 
explained previously, the initial research suggests that the 
reform does not increase litigation rates.45 To be clear, this 
does not suggest that the harmless error rule as applied by 
overreaching courts is the best mechanism for fulfilling the 
intent of both resolute and irresolute testators.46 Instead, it 
simply means that the reform is preferable to the 
conventional law. 
It is also worth noting that the type of overreaching 
about which Baron is concerned should not be surprising. 
As explained previously, under the conventional law, courts 
are directed to authenticate wills based solely on formal 
compliance.47 The court’s stated task is purely to evaluate 
formal compliance, not to independently assess the will’s 
authenticity. However, recognizing that some testators 
make mistakes that can undermine the fulfillment of their 
intent, courts sometimes overstep the conventional law’s 
bounds, deeming wills to be in compliance with the 
prescribed formalities even when formal defects are clear.48 
                                                                                                     
probable intent.”). 
 44.  See generally, e.g., Langbein, supra note 10 (explaining why it is 
beneficial to allow for some errors in execution if decedent’s intent is clear); 
Langbein, supra note 12 (same). For an overview of the reform movement’s 
arguments, see generally Glover, supra note 8. 
 45.  See supra notes 34–38 and accompanying text (showing how litigation 
has not seemed to increase when applying the harmless error rule). 
 46.  Elsewhere, I have argued that courts should apply the harmless error 
rule more consistently and predictably. For a fuller discussion of these 
arguments, see generally Glover, supra note 41. 
 47.  See supra notes 7–9 and accompanying text (discussing the importance 
of formalities in conventional wills law and the rule of strict compliance). 
 48.  See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 7, at 171 (“To avoid . . . harsh 
result[s], some courts have occasionally excused or corrected one or another 
innocuous defect in execution.”). 
 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 288 (2016) 302
The overreaching of courts within the context of the 
harmless error rule is therefore an extension of this 
previous overreaching. Now that some courts are authorized 
to fulfill the testator’s intent through the harmless error 
rule, they have simply found a new frontier through which 
to push the limits of the law. Thus, it is both tolerable and 
expected that the clear and convincing evidence standard 
does not establish a well-defined and impermeable 
boundary for the exercise of judicial discretion. 
In sum, Baron’s article draws much needed attention to 
the tension between the law’s paradigmatic testator, who is 
resolute and rational, and the many actual testators, who 
are irresolute and irrational. In particular, she persuasively 
argues that greater attention should be devoted to how the 
law accounts for irresolute testators. As explained above, 
however, the harmless error rule’s clear and convincing 
evidence standard is not necessarily an appropriate target 
for criticism in this regard. Indeed, whatever problems the 
clear and convincing evidence standard might have, the 
harmless error rule and its clear and convincing evidence 
standard are preferable to the conventional law’s rule of 
strict compliance. 
 
